The forty-day war between Iran and the United States cannot be regarded merely as a military confrontation between two countries. One of the most important consequences of this war is the change in the security calculations of America’s allies in Asia and the growing doubt about Washington’s ability to manage several crises simultaneously. If in the past a significant part of America’s credibility rested on the assumption that this country could provide military support to its allies anywhere in the world, the Iran war has subjected this image to a serious test. Now the central question among some of Washington’s allies is this: if America becomes embroiled in a major war, will it still have the capability, resources, and readiness necessary to defend its other allies at the same time?
In an analysis, The New York Times addressed this very concern among America’s allies in Asia and showed that the Iran war has not merely consumed Washington’s military resources, but has also affected the confidence of this country’s allies. This issue gains greater importance in a context in which China is rapidly increasing its military power, and Asian countries are simultaneously facing a more complex security environment. Therefore, any sign of a decline in America’s capability or readiness can affect the security calculations of these countries.
The Philippines is one of the notable examples in this regard. In recent years, because of territorial and maritime disputes with China, this country has needed security cooperation with the United States more than before. However, at the same time as tensions between Philippine forces and the Chinese coast guard have increased, Manila is diversifying its relations and increasing cooperation with other partners. This behavior cannot be regarded merely as a diplomatic choice; rather, it can be seen as a sign of an American ally’s effort to reduce its security dependence on a single power.
The logic of such behavior is clear. In conditions of security uncertainty, governments usually try to increase their options. The greater the likelihood of a major crisis, the more risk complete dependence on a single ally can create. If the Iran war has created the perception among Asian countries that America, in the event of a large-scale conflict, may face limitations in resources and military capacity, it is natural that some of Washington’s allies would seek to build more diverse security networks.
The importance of this matter becomes greater when we consider the military costs of the Iran war. According to an analysis cited by The New York Times, the war has placed America’s military resources under strain. American forces have faced missile and drone attacks, some bases have been evacuated, and stockpiles of air defense missiles have also decreased. These developments have direct significance from one perspective, but their strategic importance goes beyond the number of missiles or equipment consumed.
The core issue is the credibility of America’s deterrence. Military power can play a deterrent role only when a country’s rivals and its allies simultaneously believe in the capability and the will to use this power. If America’s allies conclude that Washington, in a major war, consumes a significant portion of its resources and consequently lacks the ability to respond to other crises simultaneously, the credibility of America’s security commitments will also be affected.
In fact, the Iran war has highlighted a classic problem for great powers: the limitation of resources in the face of the breadth of commitments. America has a vast network of allies and security partners in Europe and Asia and simultaneously faces China, Russia, and various regional crises. This network enhances America’s power when Washington can maintain its commitments in several regions at the same time. But if a major war engages a significant portion of America’s military capacity, this very vast network can become a challenge.
From this perspective, the consequence of the Iran war for America is not merely the depletion of weapons stockpiles or the increase in military costs; rather, the more important issue is the growing doubt about the reliability of American power. Washington’s allies may still regard America as their most important security partner, but at the same time they may conclude that they should not tie their entire national security to America’s capability. This distinction is very important; because the weakening of an alliance does not necessarily begin with the severing of relations or a formal withdrawal from treaties, but can begin where allies gradually seek complementary and alternative options.
In such conditions, China can also benefit from the change in the calculations of America’s allies. Beijing does not necessarily need to push America out of Asia; it is enough for confidence in Washington’s ability to manage crises simultaneously to decline. If the countries of the region feel that America, in the event of a major war, cannot support them quickly and sufficiently, more room for maneuver will be created for China. For this reason, the competition between America and China is not only a competition over the number of ships, aircraft, or missiles; it is also a competition over the confidence of allies.
From this perspective, the Iran war has imposed a significant geopolitical cost on America. Washington may be able to rebuild part of its weapons stockpiles in the future, produce new equipment, and increase its military capabilities; but rebuilding the confidence of allies is far more difficult and time-consuming. Security confidence is formed on the basis of experience, and if the allies of a great power feel that they may be left alone in a time of crisis, changing this mindset will not be easily possible.
Ultimately, the forty-day war between Iran and the United States must be assessed from an angle beyond the direct outcome of the battlefield. This war showed that even a military power such as America faces limitations in resources, capacity, and the possibility of managing multiple fronts simultaneously. The consequence of this situation in Asia may be a gradual change in the behavior of Washington’s allies—from increasing independent defense capabilities to expanding security relations with other powers.
Therefore, the real cost of the Iran war for America is not summed up only in the missiles, bases, and military resources consumed; the larger cost is the weakening of part of the allies’ confidence in Washington’s ability to defend them simultaneously. If this trend continues, the Iran war could, beyond a military defeat or victory, become an important point in the transformation of Asia’s security order; a point at which America’s allies increasingly conclude that for their security they must count on options beyond Washington.
MNA
