
Donald Trump’s recent positions on the need for more Arab countries to join the normalization process with the Zionist regime, alongside any potential agreement with Iran, are less a diplomatic initiative and more a reminder of the same old American policy—a policy that sees Arab countries not as genuine partners, but as tools to advance Washington’s interests and ensure Israel’s security.
Over the past years, various US administrations have tried to create the impression in the region that drawing closer to Tel Aviv and operating within Washington’s security projects can bring stability and calm to Arab governments. But what has been the practical outcome of these policies? Today, the region has not become more tranquil; on the contrary, it faces more complex layers of insecurity, political crises, and military tensions.
Trump may be the only politician who articulates this view bluntly. He has repeatedly described Arab countries as a source of funding for American policies, and now he pursues the same approach under the guise of pressure to expand the Abraham Accords. The clear meaning of this policy is that Arab governments must pay costs, concede political advantages, and ultimately rely only on guarantees that the region’s track record has shown to be far from reliable.
Normalization: A Project That Failed to Deliver Security
When the normalization process between some Arab governments and the Zionist regime began, one of the main American media narratives was that these agreements could reduce regional tensions and create a new path toward collective security. However, developments over the past few years have called nearly all of these claims into question.
Regional conflicts have not stopped, threats have not disappeared, and even the countries that joined this process have not felt more secure. On the contrary, many of them now find themselves more exposed to security crises than before. In recent years, the economic infrastructure, energy routes, and even the geopolitical standing of Arab countries have repeatedly come under threat, demonstrating that security is not the product of signing showpiece agreements.
In reality, what the United States sold to Arab countries was not so much “security” as a permanent dependency—a dependency that has imposed heavy financial and political costs on the Arab world. Astronomical arms deals, pressure to align politically with Washington, and entry into costly regional projects were part of the price paid by Arab governments, without any tangible gains in terms of stability and security.
On the other hand, normalization has not only failed to resolve the Palestine issue, but has deepened the rift between Arab governments and public opinion in the Muslim world. Palestine remains a central concern for the peoples of the region, and any attempt to ignore it will mean increased distrust within Arab societies.
The Experience of War: Resistance or Dependency?
The developments of Iran’s forty-day war have changed many previous equations. At a time when the United States and the Zionist regime believed they could tilt the regional balance in their favor through maximum pressure, Iran’s resistance demonstrated that the equations in West Asia are no longer one-sided as before.
What captured the region’s public attention in this war was not merely its military dimension, but the fact that, contrary to decades of propaganda, reliance on America does not necessarily bring security, and steadfastness does not inevitably lead to collapse. This has shaken the image of absolute American and Israeli power in the region that the United States had spent years trying to construct.
In contrast, many Arab governments that had long based their policies on American support saw that even massive arms purchases and full political alignment with Washington have not been able to create lasting security for them.
This has led a segment of the Arab elite to seriously ask whether continuing along this path is truly in the interest of the region’s peoples.
The reality is that the experience of the past several decades shows that the United States, rather than seeking to create stability, uses regional crises to manage its own interests. The higher the tension, the greater the arms sales, the more new coalitions are formed, and the deeper the security dependency of Arab countries becomes.
The Fate of the Arabs: Independence or a Repeat of a Historic Mistake?
Today, the Arab world faces a critical test. Some governments still imagine that closer alignment with Washington and Tel Aviv can consolidate their position, but recent experience tells a different story. The West Asia region has entered a phase in which it can no longer be managed with old formulas.
The Arab nations can clearly see that the normalization project has not stopped wars, has not resolved the Palestine crisis, and has not even prevented the increase in threats against Arab countries. Under these circumstances, insisting on continuing down the same path could deepen political and social rifts within the Arab world.
Trump’s remarks have once again proven that America’s view of the region remains a cost–benefit calculus. In this view, Arab countries must spend their financial resources, political capacity, and even their regional credibility to advance American projects, without any real guarantee for their own future.
Conclusion
Developments in recent years have shown that imported security is not lasting security. Governments that imagine they can build stability by relying on foreign power and ignoring the demands of their people will sooner or later face the harsh realities of the region. The experience of normalizing relations with the Zionist regime has, to date, shown that this path has led neither to calm nor managed to reduce existing crises.
Perhaps the time has come for Arab countries, instead of repeating failed American prescriptions, to move towards an independent redefinition of their interests. More than anything, the region needs genuine cooperation among its peoples, not coalitions built on fear, dependency, and bargaining over the Palestinian cause.
MNA
